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WHAT IS A TRANSFER OF TITLE?
Legal analysis may seem dry and profitless to many. What if a
profit can come of it after all! In Hudson & M. R. R. v. State (,9i9,
N. Y.) 125 N. E. 202, a bit of analysis saved paying a double stock
transfer tax. A statute imposed a stamp tax "on all sales, or agree-
ments to sell, or memoranda of sales of stock, and upon any and all
transfers of shares . . . whether made . by any delivery,
or by any paper or agreement . . . and whether investing the
holder with the beneficial interest in or legal title to said stock, or
merely with the possession or use thereof for any purpose
By a voting trust agreement made in 19o8 certain shares were vested
in three trustees. In 1913, by a later agreement made by all parties
interested, the stock was deposited in escrow, and three banks were
empowered to procure the transfer to them of the stock by merely filing
a copy of a resolution for that purpose with the depositary, whereupon
title was to vest in the banks at once; the banks were further empow-
ered to cause the formation of a new voting trust and to cause the
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deposited stock to be transferred to the new trustees; other "broad
and flexible powers" were given to the banks to carry out the new
agreement by such means as might seem to them expedient. The
banks never formally exercised the power to cause title to vest in them-
selves, but they created new trustees and ordered the depositary to
deliver the certificates to these trustees. Did this transaction involve
two transfers of the stock within the meaning of the tax law, or only
one transfer?
It was argued for the State that there were two transfers, that the
banks by their order to the depositary had caused title to vest in them-
selves, and that the new trustees could take title only from the empow-
ered banks. The court rightly held that only one tax was due; the
agreement of 1913 did not invest the banks "with the beneficial interest
in or legal title to said stock," and the exercise of the banks' power
caused a single transfer of such title from the old trustees to the new
ones, the beneficial interest' remaining continuously in the same indi-
viduals.
What is legal title and what is a transfer thereof? Of the agree-
ment of 1913 the court says: "Its only effect upon the ownership of or
title to the stock was the creation in the managers (the banks) of the
privilege . . . of acquiring the stock, or of the right to direct such
other disposition of it" . . . The court says that the "right" was
exercised but that the "privilege" never was. Further on, with a
nicer discrimination in words, the court says: "The power to direct
the transfer to the new trustees did exist in the managers through the
agreement of 1913." But "that power was not the equivalent of a
vesting in them of the legal title to the stock, nor did it necessitate
such vesting."
Both the "privilege" and the "right" first mentioned included
powers vested in the banks. If those powers do not constitute "title"
or "ownership," what is lacking? We must first distinguish the
operative facts from the resulting legal relations; for "title" is often
used to connote both indiscriminately. Such operative facts are the
acts of the parties expressing agreement and the physical documents
executed thereunder, the delivery and the recording of such docu-
ments; these are sometimes described as "the title." But by "title"
we usually mean something other than these. We mean that because
of the foregoing operative facts certain legal relations exist. We say
that one has the title or possesses title. We mean by this that he may
do certain things that other persons may not do, that other persons
must do and forbear to do certain things that he is not commanded to
do or to forbear to do, that by his own voluntary act he can cause
'It is not necessary here to analyze "beneficial interest." Such an interest
is also a very valuable part of entire "ownership." It, too, consists of certain
limited powers, privileges, rights, and immunities.
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new legal relations to exist while other persons cannot. It is of these
permissions, commands, powers, and immunities that "title" or own-
ership" consists. The owner may consume or use or carry away his
goods, without societal penalty; these are valuable privileges. The
owner will receive societal assistance in preventing other persons from
consuming, using, or carrying away; these are valuable rights. The
owner can confer ownership, in part or in whole, upon others; these
are valuable powers. The owner's rights, privileges, and powers
cannot be extinguished by others; these are valuable immunities.
If this is what having title means, it can be seen that one may have
part title and not the whole.2  So it was with the banks; they had
large and valuable powers, that usually pertain to an owner. In com-
plete ownership, however, these powers are exclusive and they are
accompanied by exclusive rights and privileges. It does not appear
whether or not after the agreement of 1913 the old voting trustees had
any rights, powers, or privileges left. In all probability they had
some of these left; but they had no immunities with respect to the
banks, for the banks had power to divest them of every element of title.
The banks in fact exercised this power eventually and caused title to
pass to new trustees. It is important for us to know just what ele-
ments of title remained in the old trustees while the banks were enjoy-
ing such extensive powers; but this is left to surmise. The existence
of the powers in the banks, at any rate, did not constitute the whole of
title and did not bring them within the meaning of the tax law.
There is no question that the court was correct in holding that the
exercise of the banks' power did not constitute two transfers. Far
from being a transfer to the banks, it was a transfer from them. It
was one transfer of the two parts of title-of such part as still
remained in the old trustees and also of the part held by the banks
themselves. The extensive powers of the banks were no doubt extin-
guished by their action; and thereafter if such powers existed at all,
they were in the new trustees.
Title is not a physical quantity, and on its transfer we cannot see it
jump. It is neither a button nor a bit of sealing wax nor a scrap of
paper. But by not having it the banks saved a pretty penny in stamps.
A. L. C.
DUE PROCESS AND INJURIES FROM TERMINATION OF FRANCHISE
The decision in Johnson v. Lake Drunmond Canal and Water Com-
pany (I919. Va.) 99 S. E. 771, seems both unjust and unnecessary.
It appears that in 1787 the Virginia legislature incorporated a canal
'For another recent case involving a tax on the "transfer of property,"
where part but not all of the title had passed, see RECENT CASE NOTES, sub tit.
TAXATION.
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company to erect a canal which should "forever after" be a public
highway, free for transportation of goods and for travel on payment
of the tolls imposed by the act of incorporation. In 1839 another act
was passed authorizing the same company to construct an outlet from
its canal to the Elizabeth river and granting it the power of eminent
domain, provided, however, that the proprietors of abutting land
should have free passage through the outlet.1 Prior to the construc-
tion of the outlet these lands either bordered on or were intersected by
navigable creeks or streams reaching deep water and thus giving deep
water access. The building of the outlet or canal completely destroyed
these creeks or streams and the proviso of the Act of 1839 was inserted
in order to give abutting proprietors deep water access through the
canal in place of the access which was being destroyed. Soon there-
after the outlet was completed and the privilege of passage has been
used by abutting proprietors, deep water access adding greatly to the
value of the lands. In 1851 a railroad was given permission by the
legislature to erect drawbridges across the outlet, but so as not to
hinder, obstruct or delay passage of any craft on the canal; and if
any such inconvenience resulted from the construction of the road, it
was to be declared a nuisance and abated by the circuit court. In 1916
the latter portion of this Act was repealed and defendant canal com-
pany, who had succeeded the original canal company, was authorized
by the legislature to abandon maintenance and operation of this por-
tion of the canal or of so much of it as it deemed desirable. The
defendant canal company has now sold to the defendant railroad the
privilege of crossing the outlet by a permanent fill, bridge or obstruc-
tion and the railroad proposes to cross the outlet in this manner, so as
completely to shut off all passage through it at the point of crossing.
The plaintiffs, abutting landowners, bring this bill for an injunction
which the court dismisses on the defendants' demurrer.
After some hesitation the court admits that each landowner's right
and privilege of passage constituted an easement and thus property,
but it avoids constitutional objections by the argument that such right
and privilege exist only so long as does the canal franchise, and that
the latter may be terminated at any time by act of the legislature which
originally granted it. It is also admitted that this easement was
1 "Provided, however, that the outlet and lock, or locks, which the said com-
pany may cause to be constructed under this act, shall be free for all vessels,
boats, lighters and rafts of timber the proprietors of which, reside, or own
lands, upon said outlet, or Deep creek, to pass and repass, free of any charge
of toll or tonnage, at all times, when it can be safe to open said lock or locks;
and, if any such vessels, boats, lighters or rafts of timber, shall be detained
or hindered in passing the same, through any fault or neglect of said company,
their agents or servants, the said company shall be liable for all injury or
damage sustained thereby, to be recovered by warrant, petition or action at
law, according to the extent of damage sustained as the case may be."
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undoubtedly a factor in the computation of damages in the original
eminent domain proceedings; but it is said that the deduction made
from the amount of damages awarded because of this easement must
be taken to have been ascertained on the theory that the easement
would cease with abandonment of the franchise by consent of the
legislature. Obviously this is but the arbitrary rule which would
follow the court's decision on the main point and is not based upon
what actually may have happened. In fact it would appear to be
pretty surely contrary to the view of the parties at the time of the
condemnation. They must have expected the easement to be unlimited
in point of time, in view of the fact that it was not in terms limited,
that it was in substitution for unlimited privileges of deep water
access, and that the canal itself was in terms to last forever. The
court's point of view is shown in its contention that to decide for the
plaintiff is to hold that the franchise cannot be relinquished even with
legislative consent.
Now if it were necessary to accept the dilemma as offered by the
court and hold that under the circumstances the franchise could not be
abandoned without infringing the plaintiff's rights, that result would
nevertheless seem much fairer than the one reached in the case. And
although the court states that the case is a novel one, there would not
seem to be wanting cases fairly analogous, such as those where dam-
ages are claimed and, under the better rule at least, are awarded for
destruction of an abutting owner's privilege of access when a highway
is abandoned. 2 The cases cited by the court3 state only the obvious
rule that a franchise may be abandoned with legislative consent with,
out infringement of rights of members of the public in general. It
is, of course, clear that the operation of a franchise may give individ-
uals at large certain privileges, e. g. of transportation, and incidental
rights, e. g. against discrimination, although such individuals would
not thereby obtain rights that the franchise should not be abandoned.
'See cases collected and considered in RECENT CASE NoTEs (i919) 28 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 6o6, 6o7, to Morris v. Covington County (i1g9, Miss.) 8o So.
337 (damages awarded for destruction of means of access by abandonment
of a highway). As to the awarding of damages only, the court in the principal
case at the plaintiffs' request dismisses the bill without prejudice to any pos-
sible action at law, though it expressly states that it does not believe there is
any remedy at law. It would seem, moreover, that injunction and not damages
is the remedy and that the canal company, having taken part of the plaintiffs'
property by eminent domain, should, if it desires to destroy the remnant, be
relegated to the same method.
' Vought v. Columbus, etc., Ry. (i898) 58 Oh. St. 123, 5o N. E. 442; (igoo)
176 U. S. 481, 2o Sup. Ct. 398, 44 L. ed. 554; Walsh v. Columbus, Hocking
& A. R. R. (1goo) 176 U. S. 469, 2o Sup. Ct. 393, 44 L. ed. 549; Chase v. Sutton
Mfg. Co. (849, Mass.) 4 Cush. 152; Fredericks v. Penn Canal Co. (1885) lo9
Pa. 50, 2 At. 48; Saylor v. Penn Canal Co. (1897) 183 Pa. 167, 38 At]. 598,
63 Am. St. Rep. 749. As to a change of use, see note 7, infra.
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The situation would be vastly otherwise, however, in the case of obli-
gations assumed by the franchise owner in favor of certain definite
individuals.4 Would the Virginia court say that a street railway com-
pany, for example, might repudiate its debts upon obtaining consent to
abandon its franchise? If so, there may still be a ray of hope for
trolley investors. Surely a disinclination to hold the canal company
responsible for the maintenance of the canal is too small a basis upon
which to find a limitation of the plaintiffs' rights.
But the case does not call for a decision on this point. It does not
deal with a claimed duty upon the part of the canal company to con-
tinue the canal, but with the canal company's claimed power to sell out
to the railroad a privilege of active obstruction. The plaintiffs are
not asking for affirmative action from the defendants, but only that
the defendants' affirmative acts of obstruction be enjoined. Although
the plaintiffs' petition clearly points this out,' the court utterly fails to
observe the distinction. It is submitted that a judgment for the plain-
tiffs would follow a recognition of this distinction through the applica-
tion of either one of two well settled legal principles: (i) that one
who has an easement may sue for its obstruction, though in the absence
of agreement he himself must keep in repair the physical objects
necessary to its exercise ;6 and (2) that where originally only an ease-
ment in land is condemned for public purposes, the owner upon the
abandonment of the public use holds the land as before the condemna-
tion.7 The court adverts to neither of these principles, but does state
that the servient tenement to the easement of each landowner is the
' Cases which seem more apposite than those cited by the court are those of
leases of the surplus water not needed for canal purposes, where it is held that
the implied covenant to the lessee of quiet enjoyment does not prevent an
abandonment of the franchise with legislative consent. Hoagland v. New York,
etc., R. R. (1887) 1II Ind. 443, 12 N. E. 83, 13 N. E. 572; Fox v. Cincinnati
(1881) 104 U. S. 783. But the analogy is only apparent. It does not seem
improper to draw the inference, where the parties are freely contracting with
each other, that they contemplate the lease to end with the franchise. Moreover,
the lessee cannot be so very greatly harmed since his obligation to pay rent
must cease at the same time.
" Par. 18 of the petition to the effect that even if the canal company might be
permitted to suspend operation of the canal, it "had no right . . . to
authorize said N. & W. Ry. Company to destroy the navigation of the same by
your orators."
'This principle is so obvious that cases are not cited. That the owner of the
easement must make his own repairs has long been settled. See Taylor v.
Whitehead (1781, K. B.) 2 Doug. 745.
" Vought v. Columbus, etc., Ry., supra; Whitney v. State (1881) 96 N. Y.
24o, 248. It has been held that by legislative consent one easement of a public
nature may be substituted for another, as a railroad may be substituted for a
canal, but only upon paying for the additional damage caused. Hatch v. Cin-
cinnati, etc. (1868) 18 Oh. St. 92, 122. Even this has been denied. Pittsburgh,
etc., Co. v. Bruce (1882) 1i2 Pa. 23, 28. See 9 C. J. 1151.
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franchise and also that the canal company obtained the fee of the
land through which the canal flowed.
Considering .these holdings seriatim, while the court cites authority
for its holding that a franichise may be the servient tenement to an
easement," it would seem that this involves a confusion of thought.
For the servient tenement is the physical object concerning which the
easement owner has legal relations with members of the public in
general, while a franchise is itself an aggregate of legal relations of the
same general nature as the easement.9 But this point may be waived
since it is clear that what the court's holding really amounts to is that
the easement can last only as long as the franchise. Why this hold-
ing? The court's answer is quite involved, but seems to be this. The
"right" of passage is created by the commonwealth as an incident to
the grant of the franchise. The land itself is acquired in fee by the
canal company either through condemnation or purchase and hence is
a grant from the individuals, to which the commonwealth is not a
party. The right can only be attached to the commonwealth's own
creation, viz., to the franchise. Hence it ends with the ending of
the franchise. This is a manifest non sequitur. The commonwealth
has made the building of the canal and the exercise of the power of
eminent domain expressly 'subject to the proviso of giving the right
and privilege of passage. The canal company need not have accepted
the authorization in view of this proviso. As it did accept, the proviso
must necessarily enter into and form a part of the agreement between
the company and each landowner whose land was taken under the
company's power.' 0 And the proviso is more than a mere agreement;
it has all the essentials of an easement giving in rem rights against
people in general." It seems clear that the easement exists inde-
'Washburn, Easements and Servitudes (4th ed. 1885) 7, 9, 1o, 2, and 2
Minor, Institutes (3d ed. 1879) 5 are cited.
'For discussion of the nature of a franchise see (I919) 28 YAmE LAw
JOuRNAL, 485; of the nature of an easement, see (1917) 27 ibid., 66, and (i919)
29 ibid., 218. In this case is not the land with the canal running through it the
servient tenement?
"This would surely follow if the land was acquired by eminent domain, and
as the parties undoubtedly contracted in view of the express provisions of the
statute, it would seem to follow equally if the land was acquired by grant. The
plaintiffs' petition does not disclose which method was ultimately employed.
" Even though the term "pxoperty" is used in distinction to the term "con-
tract" the interest here created fulfills all the requirements of "property." As
the writer has elsewhere suggested (1919) 29 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 94, note i6,
this restricted use of the term property is not in accordance with ordinary'
usage, which would include contract obligations as property. In general terms
property means anything which may have economic value. Cf. Slaughterhouse
Cases (1873, U. S.) 6 Wall. 36, 127: "Property is everything which has an
exchangeable value." Hence one party to every legal relation would have
property. The person having the property would ordinarily be the one who has
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pendently of the franchise and that its duration depends on ordinary
principles, namely, that the intent of the parties at the time of its crea-
tion shall determine its duration. As suggested above, this intent was
pretty surely that it should be unlimited, especially in view of the fact
that it was substituted for unlimited rights and privileges of deep
water access.
On the other point the court merely states that the canal company
acquired a fee simple. It is clear in any event that it was not an unen-
cumbered fee simple. Comparing the position of the landowners
before and after the acquisition of the property by the canal company,
it would appear that before such acquisition the landowners possessed
the various rights and privileges which go to make up ownership
including those of deep water access, while after such acquisition
though a part of these rights and privileges had ceased there neverthe-
less existed the rights and privileges of deep water access. True these
rights and privileges were not strictly the same as those previously
existing, since they were to be exercised in a slightly different manner,
but they are sufficiently analogous to make the situation more closely
identical with the taking of only a part of one's property in land, than
with a taking of the entire property. Hence there would be a situation
calling for the application of the rule previously referred to that the
property still remaining in the original owners is not destroyed by the
abandonment of the public use.
It may therefore be debatable whether under the proviso in question
it was intended that the canal company should be under a duty to keep
the passageway in repair. But in view of the express wording of the
proviso it hardly seems debatable that the company and its grantee are
under a duty not to obstruct the passageway or cause it to be
obstructed. 12 One may hope, therefore, that the case will reach the
United States Supreme Court.
C. E. C.
the affirmative (right, privilege, power or immunity) end of the legal relation,
though liabilities or duties, for example, may sometimes be desirable and hence
exchangeable. In this view property would also include rights and privileges
ordinarily termed "personal," e. g. the right to personal liberty, the right to
personal security. This would seem accurate. What Esau sold Jacob for a
mess of pottage-his "birthright"--was something more than a right of inher-
itance. It seems to have included, among other things, the privilege of sitting
first at the table. 43 Genesis, 33. So the spectacle of prize fighters relinquishing
the right of personal security for money is common. The result is that property
is too general a term for use in careful analysis where avoidable. Hence the
ancient dogma criticised in (192o) 29 YALu LAW JOURNAL, 344, that "equity pro-
tects only property rights" is, when analyzed, unobjectionable but meaningless.
12 Note particularly the latter part of the proviso quoted above in note I,
supra.
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DO CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS CONTROL REFORMERS?
Mr. Justice Holmes, who loves a legal paradox, has said that not-
withstanding constitutional limitations the police power might be exer-
cised "in aid of what is held by strong and preponderant opinion to be
greatly and immediately.necessary to the public welfare."',
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have applied this generaliza-
tion to war time prohibition and have settled in advance many ques-
tions relating to constitutional prohibition. One question, however,
which has not been directly answered because it has not been asked,
is whether the National Prohibition Act, in so far as it prohibits the
sale and possession of intoxicating liquor, applies to stocks of liquor
on hand before the Eighteenth Amendment was adopted.
Theoretically this should depend upon the answer to one, or both, of
two questions: Is the power of the United States in the premises sub-
ject to constitutional limitations? And if so, is the absolute, or prac-
tically absolute, prohibition against the sale and possession of liquor
in the hands of one who became its owner while it was still a lawful
article of merchandise a deprivation of his property without due
process of law?
If the Fifth Amendment applies, the first question is answered in the
affirmative. But if it be suggested that the Eighteenth Amendment is
on its face a new and unlimited grant of police power, one may still
ask where the power came from. The several states do not possess,
and cannot grant, unlimited police powers. Most of them are for-
bidden by their own constitutions to take away property without due
process of law, and all of them are forbidden to do so by the Four-
teenth Amendment. It might be said that an amendment proposed by
a constitutional convention or adopted by state conventions was a
grant of power directly from the people; but an amendment proposed
by a constitutionally restrained Congress, and adopted by constitution-
ally restrained state legislatures, would seem to be congenitally limited
so far as individual property rights are concerned.
The relevant judicial history of the second question may be outlined
as follows: In 1856 the New York Court of Appeals held that a statute
prohibiting the sale of liquor was unconstitutional, in so far as it
operated on property in intoxicating liquor existing when the Act took
effect.
2
In 1873 an attempt was made to bring the same question before the
Supreme Court, but the plaintiff in error had failed to make his plea
specific, and the point was dismissed with the following comment:
'Noble State Bank v. Haskell (IgIO) 219 U. S. 104, III, 31 Sup. Ct. x86, 188.
"The right of sale is of the very essence of property in any article of mer-
chandise; it is its chief characteristic; take away its vendible character and the
article is practically destroyed." Wymehamer v. People (1856) 13 N. Y. 378,
456. Cf. also (rI918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 393.
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"But if it were true, and it was fairly presented to us, that the
defendant was the owner of the glass of intoxicating liquor which he
sold to Hickey, at the time that the State of Iowa first imposed an
absolute prohibition on the sale of such liquors, then we concede that
two very grave questions would arise, namely: i. Whether this would
be a statute depriving him of his property without due process of law;
and secondly, whether if it were so, it would be so far a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment in that regard as would call for judicial
action by this court. Both of these questions whenever they may be
presented to us are of an importance to require the most careful and
most serious consideration."
'3
In Beer Company v. Massachusetts, the court said :4
"We do not mean to say that property actually in existence, and in
which the right of the owner has been vested, may be taken for the
public good, without due compensation. But we infer that the liquor
in this case, as in the case of Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, was
not in existence when the liquor law of Massachusetts was passed."
In Eberle v. Michigan, the point was again pressed and again left unde-
cided.
"It was further contended that the act takes property without due
process of law because it made no provision for the sale of liquor on
hand at the time the law became operative; But the record does not
call for a decision of that question, nor does it bring the case within
the principle, suggested in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, iS Wall. 129, 133, that
a statute absolutely prohibiting the sale of property in existence at the
time of the passage of the law would amount to confiscation and be
void as depriving the owner of his property without due process of
law."5
In Barbour v. Georgia, the plaintiff in error had acquired the liquor
in question after the Georgia prohibition act was enacted, but before
it became operative, and the court held that he took it with full notice
of its infirmity and with knowledge that after a day certain his right
to possess it would cease; but the court observes that,
"Whether the prohibition of sale may be constitutionally applied to
liquor acquired before the enactment of the statute was raised in Barte-
meyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, and Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97
U. S. 25, 32-33; but was not decided." e
Finally the question was brought squarely before the court in
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Company (Dec. 15, 1919) U. S.
Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, No. 589, where the constitutionality of the War
Time Prohibition Act was attacked on the ground, among others, that
'Bartemeyer v. Iowa (1873, U. S.) 18 Wall. 129, 133.
(877) 97 U. S. 25, 32.
(I914) 232 U. S. 7oo, 706, 34 Sup. Ct. 464, 466.
(I919) 249 U. S. 454, 459, 39 Sup. Ct. 316.
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it violated the Fifth Amendment by prohibiting the sale, for beverage
purposes, of-"any distilled spirits," including spirits on hand before
its enactment. The Act did not take effect until July Ist, 1919; and
the Court said:
"But no reason appears why a state statute, which postpones its
effective date long enough to enable those engaged in the business to
dispose of stocks on hand at the date of its enactment, should be
obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment, or why such a federal law
should be obnoxious to the Fifth Amendment. We cannot say that
seven months and nine days was not a reasonable time within which to
dispose of all liquors in bonded warehouses on November 21, 1918."
It may be surmised from this ruling that the Court will also hold
that the sale of liquor on hand before the adoption of the Eighteenth
Amendment may be constitutionally prohibited by the National Prohi-
bition Act; unless, indeed, it takes a shorter cut to the same result by
holding that the Eighteenth Amendment grants unlimited police power
to the United States in respect to intoxicating liquor.
Yet it is interesting, from an academic standpoint, to pursue the
subject a little further; especially so, because this part of the opinion
is not reasoned, but based on the following statement:
"The uncompensated restriction on the disposition of liquors
imposed by the act is of a nature far less severe than the restrictions
upon the use of property, acquired before the enactment of the prohibi-
tion law which were held to be permissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Mugler v. Kansas7 and kidd v. Pearson8 were cited in support.
It is submitted that the analogy is imperfect. Restrictive regula-
tions, however severe, on the use or sale of existing property, may be
and are upheld on the ground that they do not amount to a deprivation
of property.
The Mugler case went far, but the plaintiff in error still retained
the privilege of using his brewery, except for the forbidden purpose,9
and the right to sell it.
On the other hand, an absolute, or practically absolute prohibition
against selling existing property after a day certain, amounts to a total
extinguishment of one of the essential rights of ownership when that
day arrives. And it is no answer to say that the owner was given a
reasonable opportunity to sell, for, if it be his property, he has as good
a "right" to keep it as to sell it.
(z887) 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273.
8 (I888) 128 U. S. i, 9 Sup. Ct. 6.
'It does not appear in the statement of facts that Mugler was fined for selling
beer made before the Kansas statute went into effect, but that fact is not noticed
in the reported arguments or in the opinion, the relevant parts of which deal
only with the restriction on the use of the brewery, resulting in loss of value.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
A law which requires the owner of property to sell it before a day
certain or not to sell it at all, compels him to choose whether he will
be absolutely deprived of his privilege of selling it, or will relinquish
under compulsion of law his privilege of keeping it.
The distinction, which Mr. Justice Brandeis obliterates by a descrip-
tive phrase, between forbidding the future manufacture of liquor or
the sale of liquor thereafter made, and forbidding the sale of existing
stocks of liquors, was fully recognized in Beer Company v. Massachu-
setts, and Eberle v. Michigan, and by Mr. Justice Brandeis himself in
Barbour v. Georgia.
Liquor lawfully made and acquired was property when the War
Time Prohibition Act was passed; and the privilege of selling it was
one of the essential attributes of ownership.
No doubt any property which becomes dangerous to the public wel-
fare may be destroyed without compensation; but it is submitted that
existing property which has not changed cannot be converted into a
public nuisance by a mere legislative declaration; unless, indeed, con-
stitutional limitations do not control reformers.
Since the above comment was written the Supreme Court has pur-
sued the reasoning, or the state of mind, of the Kentucky Distilleries
case to its necessary conclusion. If an absolute prohibition against the
sale of merchandise is, as that opinion declares, merely a limitation
on its use, then there is no necessity for postponing the effective date
of the prohibition in order to give the owner a reasonable opportunity
to dispose of stocks on band.
It is so held by a divided court in Ruppert v. Caffey (Jan. 5, 1920)
U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term 1919, No. 603. The point decided, as
described in the dissenting opinion is, that Congress had power
"directly and instantly to prohibit the sale of a non-intoxicating bev-
erage, theretofore lawfully produced, and which until then could have
been lawfully vended, without making any provision for compensation
to the owner."
The prevailing opinion, persisting in the unreasoned assumption of
the Kentucky Distilleries case, states the same result thus: "Here, as
in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Company, supra, there was no
appropriation of private property, but merely a lessening of value due
to a permissible restriction imposed upon its use."
What will the Court say to the National Prohibition Act, which
prohibits possession as well as sale? Is that also merely a permissible




WHEN SILENCE GIVES CONSENT
In general, the courts have held that the maxim "silence gives
consent" is not a part of the law of contract. Thus where an offer
was made by an oral request to renew certain insurance policies, the
request being a part of a conversation on other subjects, it was held
that the mere silence of the insurance agent was no acceptance, even
though the offeror so understood it.' There was no evidence that the
agent heard the request. The court said: "Instead of silence being
evidence of an agreement to do the thing requested, it is evidence,
either that the question was not heard, or that it was not intended to
comply with the request."
'2
It has been held that silence will not operate as the acceptance of an
offer even though the offeror expressly states that it shall so operate.3
This rule is not at all objectionable in cases where the offeree remained
silent with no intent to accept and where the circumstances did not
make such conduct unreasonable. It may well be criticised, however,
when the offeree took the offeror at his word, intentionally used the
specified mode of acceptance, and now tries to hold the offeror to a
contract.4
In the case of Cole-Mclntyre-Norfleet Co. v. Holloway (i919,
Tenn.)214 S. W. 817, it was held that silence for an unreasonable time
operated as an acceptance of an offer. On March 26, 1917, the Com-
pany's traveling salesman solicited and received a written order for
5o barrels of meal at Holloway's country store, the order expressly
stating that the salesman had no power to make a contract and that the
order should not be binding until accepted by the seller at its own
office. The meal was to be ordered out by the buyer by July 31, or
storage was to be charged thereafter. From the court's statement it
may be presumed that this order was received by the seller, but it said
and did nothing in consequence thereof until two months later when
'Royal Insurance Co. v. Beatty (1888) 119 Pa. 6, 12 Atl. 607. To the same
effect see Rutledge v. Greenwood (i8o6, S. C.) 2 Desaus. 389; Carnahan Mfg.
Co. v. Beebe Co. (1916) 8o Ore. 124, 156 Pac. 584; Grice v. Noble (1886) 59
Mich. 515, 26 N. W. 688; Raysor v. Berkeley Co. (1886) 26 S. C. 61o, 2 S. E. i19.
'Royal Insurance Co. v. Beatty, supra, IO. In Titcomb v. United States
(1878) 14 Ct. Cl. 263, the claimant proposed an important modification in an
existing contract. The court said: "the law does not readily infer that the
defendants intended to assent from their mere silence. It was not incumbent
on the agents of the government to speak when these proposed changes were
requested. Silence was more compatible with the presumption that they refused
to yield to claimant's solicitation than that they voluntarily assented."
'Prescott v. Jones (1898) 69 N. H. 305, 41 Atl. 352; Felthouse v. Bindley
(1862) ii C. B. (N. S.) 868. The latter case can easily be distinguished, how-
ever.
'See Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917)
26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 200.
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the buyer asked for the meal to be shipped. At that time it notified
him that the order was rejected. War had been declared in the mean-
time and prices had risen. The seller might easily have notified the
buyer earlier of its rejection and the buyer might as easily have made
earlier inquiry. It was held that the seller's delay in informing the
buyer was unreasonable and that it operated as an acceptance of the
order.
It is doubtful whether the decision should be approved, admitting
the case to be close to the border line. Although the court says that
the company had a "duty to speak," it is clear that there was no such
duty in the sense that damages could be collected for not fulfilling it.
It may have been unreasonable and unfair not to speak, however, thus
justifying the court in holding that failure to speak would operate as
acceptance.5
It has been so held in several classes of cases, under somewhat
different circumstances. Thus, where the offeree has received benefits
at the hands of the offeror, knowing that the latter expected pay, and
has himself done some act necessary to the enjoyment of the benefits,
this act plus his failure to reject are held to be an acceptance. It is
on this principle that persons who receive and read periodicals for
which they have not subscribed are sometimes held bound to pay the
subscription price.6
Where the offeree has received goods offered for sale on certain
terms, the goods having been sent at his request or because of some
previous dealings making it reasonable to send them, his retention of
the goods and his failure to notify the offeror of his rejection operate
as acceptance.7 This rule has been followed in some cases, in spite of
the fact that the offeror specified a particular mode of acceptance and
this mode was not used.'
Silence by an offeree, plus the receipt of benefits conferred by the
offeror, may operate as an acceptance and a promise, even though the
offeree has himself done no operative or evidential act. There need
be no request for such benefits, but the offeree must know or have
"Assent may be by acts as well as words, and by silence, where a party is
fairly bound to speak if he dissents, as well as by speech itself." Preston v.
Amer. Linen Co. (1876) i19 Mass. 400.
'Austin v. Burge (1911) 156 Mo. App. 286, 137 S. W. 618 (subscriber ordered
paper stopped, but he continued to read it when it came); Fogg z. Portsmouth
Atheneum (1862) 44 N. H. 115 (same, with several express repudiations of
liability).
"Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co. (1893) I58 Mass. 194, 33 N. E. 495; Place v.
Mcllvain (1868) 38 N. Y. 96. See also Batcheller v. Whittier (igio) 12 Cal.
App. 262, io7 Pac. 141 (services rendered as attorney).
' Wheeler v7 Klaholt (igoi) 178 Mass. 141, 59 N. E. 756; Evans Piano Co. v.
Tully (1917) 116 Miss. 267, 76 So. 833. In these cases one mode of acceptance
was specified and the only specified alternative was rejection. See adverse com-
ment in (I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 561.
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reason to know that the benefits are being offered to him with the
expectation of pay and under circumstances such that it would be
easy to reject the benefits.'
If an acceptance is too late to be operative as such, but is not so late
as to be quite beyond the realm of reasonable doubt, there is some
authority that the ensuing silence of the offeror will operate to com-
plete the contract.' 0
All of the foregoing cases can be distinguished from the instant
case. In it there has been no enjoyment of benefits by the offeree,
there has been no wrongful retention of goods sent, and it is not a case
of a late acceptance silently acquiesced in. If silence is to operate as
acceptance here it must be chiefly because of the one fact that the
seller itself solicited the order through its salesman and specified its
terms. This particular fact has been considered in a rather large
class of cases. Where an application has been made for an insurance
policy, accompanied by the premium, it has been intimated that unrea-
sonable delay in considering the application may operate as an accept-
ance if the application is one that would have been accepted had it
been considered." The general rule, however, ig that such delay is in
itself no acceptance. 12  These cases are like the principal case in that
the agents of the company solicit the application, and it is expressly
provided that there is to be no contract until acceptance at the home
'In Day v. Caton (1876) I19 Mass. 513, the defendant was compelled to pay
for a party wall. The court said: "The maxim, Qui facet consentire videtur, is
to be construed indeed as applying only to those cases where the circumstances
are such that a party is fairly called upon either to deny or admit his liability.
But if silence may be interpreted as assent where a proposition is made to one
which he is bound to deny or admit, so also it may be if he is silent in the face
of facts which fairly call upon him to speak." In Taylor v. Dexter Engine Co.
(1888) 146 Mass. 613, x6 N. E. 462, the defendant's engine was in the plaintiff's
basement, having been lawfully placed there by a tenant who has since vacated.
The plaintiff notified the defendant that if the engine were not removed by a
certain day there would be a fixed charge per day. The defendant failed to
remove the engine for some days. The court held the defendant bound to pay
(the exact amount not appearing). In these two cases the duty enforced might
be regarded as quasi-contractual, but the court seems not to have so regarded it.
"°See Phillips v. Moor (i88o) 71 Me. 78; Morrell v. Studd [1913] 2 Ch. 648
(In both of these cases there was evidence other than mere silence that the
offeror assented to the belated acceptance). This rule is adopted in the German
Civ. Code, sec. 149; Jap. Civ. Code, Art. 5z; and in Swiss Code Oblig, sec. 5,
in case the acceptance was started on time but was delayed thereafter. Contra:
Maclay v. Harvey (1878) 90 Ill. 525; Ferrier v. Storer (1884) 63 Iowa, 484,
ig N. W. 288.
'Dorman v. Connecticut F. L Co. (1914) 41 Okla. 509, 139 Pac. 262; North-
western Mut. L. L Co. v. Neafus (191) 145 Ky. 563, 140 S. W. 1026. In both
cases, however, it was held that there was no contract.
'Alabama G. L. Ins. Co. v. Mayes (1878) 61 Ala. 163; Misselhorn v. Mutual
etc. Ass'n (1887, C. C. E. D. Mo.) 30 Fed. 545; Van Arsdale v. Young (i9o8)
21 Okla. 1x, 95 Pac. 778.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
office. In such cases, however, the company still has important mat-
ters of policy to pass upon, and both parties anticipate that acceptance
is to be indicated in one particular mode-by the execution and deliv-
ery of a formal insurance policy.
One other class of cases deserves passing mention. Where an
unsettled running account exists between two persons, if one sends to
the other a statement of the account it is generally held that retention
of this by the other party without any expressed objection will render
the amount an account stated.1 3 It seems, however, that silence here
operates rather as an evidential than an operative fact. It is a rebut-
table admission against interest, not the conclusive acceptance of an
offer.
14
At the very best, the decision of the Tennessee court must be
regarded as of doubtful correctness. The acceptance of an offer may
consist of a mere forbearance to act, if such forbearance is definitely
specified as the consideration as well as the mode of acceptance ;15 but
in this case it was not so specified and silence was not the desired con-
sideration. The offer was to make a bilateral contract and a return
promise was necessary. The court leaves to mere inference even the
fact that the order ever reached the offeree. No entry of the order
in its books or other overt act in its own office is alleged. There is
nothing other than continued silence to show that the offeree intended
to accept, and nothing to show that the offeror was misled by the
silence. The offeror suffered no loss other than the disappointment
due to the failure to accept his order.18
On the petition for a rehearing the court suggests that the parties
had had previous dealings with each other. There is nothing to indi-
cate the form of these previous dealings. If the plaintiff should estab-
lish that these two parties had previously acted as if silence were an
acceptance and had always sent a notice in case of rejection, or if he
should establish that such was the general custom of business men in
the community, the court would be justified in holding that a contract
was made. But, in the absence of such a showing, it is believed that
silence alone is hardly sufficient evidence of the offeree's actual assent
and there is hardly sufficient reason to hold him bound by estoppel.
A. L. C.
See notes in 29 L. R. A. (N.S.) 335, L. R. A. 1917C 448.
"See Wiggins v. Burkhamn (1869, U. S.) io Wail. 129; State V. Illinois Cent.
R. R. (19io) 246 Ill. 188, 241, 92 N. E. 814; Dodge v. Brown (1914) 74 W. Va.
466, 82 S. E. 262.
"See Strong v. Sheffield (1895) i44 N. Y. 392, 39 N. E. 330; Miles v. New
Zealand Afford Est. Co. (1886) 32 Ch. D. 266 (Bowen's opinion); and other
cases dealing with forbearance as a consideration.
"The court suggests that the goods ordered were perishable, but this is wholly
misleading. If any goods were perishing because of the offeree's silence and
delay they were the offeree's own goods, not the offeror's.
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TREATY-MAKING POWER AS SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The efficacy of the treaty-making power to sustain federal legisla-
tion otherwise unconstitutional has again been strikingly illustrated by
the recent history of the Migratory Bird Act.
On March 4, 1913, Congress included in the Agricultural Depart-
ment Appropriation Act' the provisions of the so-called Weeks-
McLean Migratory Bird Act declaring certain migratory birds "within
the custody and protection of the government of the United States,"
prohibiting their destruction contrary to regulations which the Depart-
ment of Agriculture was authorized to adopt to give effect to the Act.
The endeavor to enforce the Act at once brought its constitutionality
into issue, and two state supreme courts and two lower federal courts
during 1914 and 1915 held the Act unconstitutional. 2 An appeal from
one of the federal decisions, the Shauver case, was carried to the
United States Supreme Court, where it was twice argued. On the
first argument, before a bench of only six judges, there was evidently
a division of opinion making a decision favorable to the Act impos-
sible, or else the case seemed sufficiently important to induce the Court
to order it re-argued before a full bench. After the re-argument early
in 1916 the Department of Agriculture, apparently fearing an adverse
decision, evidently hastened to urge upon the Department of State the
necessity of concluding a treaty with Canada protecting migratory
birds, and within a short time, on August 16, 1916, a treaty covering
much the same ground as the Act of 1913 was concluded. 3 The
Supreme Court never decided the Shauver case. On July 3, 1918,
Congress enacted the Migratory Birds Treaty Act4 to carry further
into effect the treaty of 1916 and under it the Department of Agricul-
ture has from time to time issued enforcing regulations. The consti-
tutionality of the Act of 1918 having again been contested on its
enforcement, four federal courts, including the district court for the
Eastern Arkansas District which had held the 1913 Act unconstitu-
tional, have now uniformly held the 1918 Act constitutional. 5 Thus,
the interposition of an underlying treaty has saved federal legislation,
otherwise manifestly unconstitutional, from nullity.
137 Stat. L. 847.
United States v. Shauver (1914, E. D. Ark.) 214 Fed. I54 (opinion by Judge
Trieber); United States v. McCullagh (915, Kan. iSt) 221 Fed. 288; State V.
Sawyer (1915) 113 Me. 458, 94 Atl. 886; L. R. A. 1915F 1031, note; State v.
McCullagh (I915) 96 Kan. 786, 153 Pac. 557. The Act was upheld in an unre-
ported decision of a federal district court in South Dakota, mentioned in 17
DOcKET, 1476.
' 39 Stat. L. 1702. '40 Stat. L. 755.
' United States v. Thompson (igig, E. D. Ark.) 258 Fed. 257 (opinion by
Judge Trieber); United States v. Samples (igg, W. D. Mo.) 258 Fed. 479;
United States v. Selkirk (i919, S. D. Texas) 258 Fed. 775; United States v.
Rockefeller (1gig, D. Mont.) 260 Fed. 346.
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The general recognition, by the courts construing the original Act,
that the protection of migratory birds so essential to agriculture was
an eminently useful and desirable federal function, physically impos-
sible of adequate performance by the states, did not prevent them from
holding practically uniformly that there was no authority in the federal
Constitution, express or implied, to sustain such an assumption of
federal legislative power. Able and ingenious arguments failed to
convince. The statutory declaration that the birds were within the
"custody and protection of the government of the United States" and
therefore "property of the United States" within the meaning of
Article 4, section 3, paragraph 2 of the Constitution conferring on
Congress power to make all needful rules "respecting the territory or
other property belonging to the United States" (erroneously denomi-
nated by two of the courts as the "general welfare" clause) was
opposed by the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Geer v.
Connecticut' and other cases to the effect that wild game in a state, at
common law, belonged to the sovereign, which in this country means,
to the people of the state, for whom the state is the trustee. True,
when the Geer case was decided, no theory of divided ownership
between state and federal government was in contemplation. The
attempt to sustain the original Act under the commerce clause which
had successfully supported federal legislation in prohibition of white
slavery,7 lottery tickets," impure foods and drugs,
9 and the liquor
traffic,10 was met by the assertion that such commerce or migration was
always the result of human agency, and even more squarely by the
Geer decision that the power of the state was not terminated by the
act of an individual in reducing the game to possession, but that
the state could control its disposition so as to prevent its coming under
the protection and control of the commerce clause." Incidentally, the
exercise of a federal police power as an implied power, while admitted,
was held necessarily to attach to some grant of express power, and the
' (1896) 16I U. S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 6oo. See also Sitz v. Hesterberg (i9o8) 211
U. S. 31, 29 Sup. Ct. IO; Patsone v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 138, 34
Sup. Ct. 281.
'Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. L. 825; Hoke v. United States (1913) 227 U. S.
308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281.
8 Act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. L. 963; Champion v. Ames, Lottery Case
(19o3) x88 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 32I.
'Act of June 30, i9o6, 34 Stat L. 768; Seven Cases v. United States (1916)
239 U. S. 510, 36 Sup. Ct. i9o.
"Act of March 1, 1913, 37 Stat. L. 699; Clarke Distilling Co. v. Western
Maryland Ry. Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. i8o.
X' As a constitutional argument, this reason is not altogether convincing, for
Congress may exercise power over numerous objects of state "ownership,"
such as forests, waters, etc. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. (i9o7) 2o6 U. S.
230, 27 Sup. Ct. 618; Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (i9o8) 2o9 U. S.
349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529-
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police power over the taking of birds was deemed to vest solely in the
states.12 Other arguments were employed: e. g., that the federal
power over navigable waters required the preservation of forests, and
that the protection of migratory birds which attacked destructive insect
life was necessary and proper to this end; that the protection of the
national forests alone sustained the legislation; that "property" in
the state does not exclude federal "ownership" or control, any more
than such ownership would be excluded in a new island arising within
the three-mile limit of a state; that there is some kind of "title" in
the expectancy that the birds will normally come into the country or
state which justifies repressive measures in distant states against those
impairing this normal ingress, in analogy to the riparian owner's inter-
est in preventing abnormal interference by upper owners with the fish
coming down the stream.
These arguments being apparently insufficient to convince the
majority of the United States Supreme Court, federal legislation for
the protection of migratory birds, it seemed, would have to rely upon
a constitutional amendment or upon a treaty. A treaty with Canada
was, therefore, promptly concluded and in so far as it was not self-
executing, the Act of July 3, 1918 and regulations thereunder were
designed to carry it into effect. The argument of the defendants,
prosecuted for violation of the Act,13 rested principally on the assump-
tion that the want of power to enact federal legislation on the subject
likewise operated to invalidate the treaty. The misconception was
promptly dispelled. An able opinion by Judge Trieber sustaining the
Act in the Thompson case' is based on unassailable authority. While
the Constitution limits the power of Congress to laws "made in pur-
suance of" the Constitution, the power over treaties is seemingly not
so limited, for Article 6, clause 2 merely provides that "all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land." This does not necessarily mean
that the treaty-making power is without limitation, but it does probably
mean that any matter properly the subject of negotiation with a
foreign government is within its scope. How far its subject-matter is
limited, if at all, by the Constitution, is exceedingly doubtful. Mr.
Justice Field in a celebrated dictum in Geofroy v. Riggs said that it
was
"unlimited, except by those restraints which are found in that instru-
ment against the action of the government or of its departments, and
those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of
the states. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to
" See also Brewer, J. in Kansas v. Colorado (xgo6) 2o6 U. S. 46, 89, 27 Sup.
Ct. 655.
"See note 5, supra.
" ('g. E. D. Ark.) 258 Fed. 257.
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authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character
of the government or in that of one of the states, or a cession of any
portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent."
15
It might well be contended, however, that a compulsory cession of
state territory as the result of a disastrous war would not be invali-
dated by the absence of a state's consent. Thus far no treaty has
been held unconstitutional. Probably, we could never plead constitu-
tional disability against a foreign government unwilling to release us
from a treaty obligation, unless that government could be charged
with knowledge of the disability, a circumstance hardly conceivable if
we actually concluded the treaty. Certainly, no subsequent change of
constitution can impair the validity or operation of a treaty duly con-
cluded or of an international obligation apart from treaty.
16
The supremacy of treaties in our law, both constitutional and inter-
national, has been amply demonstrated on numerous occasions. Since
the early case of Ware v. Hylton," in which the Treaty of Peace of
1783, empowering British creditors to recover their American debts,
was held to render inoperative a Virginia statute of 1777 confiscating
such debts, there has never been any doubt that the federal govern-
ment, under the treaty-making power, could take out of the control of
the states matters otherwise solely within the jurisdiction of state legis-
lation. That power has been exercised with reference to the owner-
ship and devolution of real estate, state statutes of limitation, the
removal of disabilities and discriminations against aliens by way of
taxation, engagement in certain occupations, such as fishing, residence
in particular places, suit by non-resident aliens under state statutes
granting an action for injuries causing death, consular administration
of alien decedents' estates and many other subjects.'
8  Even as to
federal legislation, the treaty is supreme so far as applicable. This
(189o) 133 U. S. 258, 267, IO Sup. Ct. 295, 297.
'The current dispute with Mexico is in part based upon the alleged incom-
patibility between article 27 of the Mexican constitution and Mexico's interna-
tional obligations with respect -to American citizens. See also, Borchard.
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (915) secs. 390ff.
17 (i796, U. S.) 3 Dallas, i99.
'The treaties and cases are discussed by Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and
Enforcement, (2d ed. 1916) secs. IO5-1o9. See also the Treaty with Italy, Feb.
25, 1913, Malloy's Treaties, Charles' Supplement (1913) 442, nullifying with
respect to Italian subjects the effect of a Pennsylvania statute upheld by the
Supreme Court in Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. (199o) 213 U. S. 268,
272, 29 Sup. Ct. 424. See also United States v. Thompson, supra, 220ff. While
the advocates of "States rights" like Mr. Henry St. George Tucker contend
that such treaties merely change the status of the alien with respect to the
law of the state rather than suspend the operation of the state law, it is hardly
doubtful that to the extent of the exercise of the treaty-power such legislation
becomes automatically inoperative. Tucker, Limitations on the Treaty-Afakin,:
Power (1915) 143ff.
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was illustrated recently when a Spanish declarant, held for evasion
of the Selective Draft Act of 1917, claimed exemption from military
service under the prior treaty of 19o3 between the United States and
Spain. Although the courts had to hold the later statute controlling,
the President, on a representation from the Spanish Ambassador,
recognized the superior binding character of the treaty by ordering the
Spaniard's release from the service.
20
It is within the power of the federal government by treaty to remove
from state control any matter which may become the subject of nego-
tiation with a foreign government. With the continued drawing
together of the world by increased facilities for travel and communica-
tion, the subjects of common interest which require international regu-
lation will continue to grow in extent and variety. Uniformity of
legislation by withdrawal from state legislative control of such sub-
jects as marriage and divorce, labor legislation, the ownership and
inheritance of property, and all matters affecting aliens would be pos-
sible by the exertion of the necessary federal treaty power. That it
has not been more indiscriminately exercised is due to the unwilling-
ness of the Department of State, or lack of confidence in the disposi-
tion of the Senate, to interfere unnecessarily with state control and
thus bring about undesirable political controversy. The advances of
foreign governments looking to the conclusion of treaties on particular
subjects such as corporation law, the ownership of real estate, etc.,
now ordinarily controlled by state legislation have, therefore, usually
been rejected on the ground that it would be inexpedient for the fed-
eral government to remove such matters from state control. It would
not have been difficult as a matter of law to settle the Japanese land
controversy in California in 1913, had it not been otherwise adjusted,
by the conclusion of a treaty nullifying the obnoxious law (assuming
two-thirds of the Senate would have concurred), but politically it
would not have been wise to antagonize the people of the Pacific coast.
And yet, while the treaty-making power confers many rights on aliens,
the fact that the enforcement of those rights is so often within the
jurisdiction of the states, over whom the federal government has no
effective control, has compelled this government on numerous occa-
sions to pay heavy indemnities to foreign governments by reason of
its inability to enforce the promises of protection, etc., made in its
treaties. This embarrassing situation should be remedied by the enact-
ment of legislation enabling the federal government to enforce the
treaty rights of aliens in the federal courts.
E. Al. B.
"Cherokee Tobacco Cases (I87O, U. S.) ii Wall. 616; Head Money Cases
(1884) 112 U. S. 580, 598, 5 Sup. Ct. 247.





Privacy and the movies-civilization advances, and new problems
confront the courts. The lady-plaintiff (if language may take cogni-
zance of sex-distinctions) in Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.
(I9I9, App. Div.) i78 N. Y. Supp. 752, was the lawyer who solved the
Ruth Cruger murder mystery. In consequence, her picture and name
were featured by the daily press, and the defendant company incor-
porated both into one of its weekly news reels of motion pictures, the
picture being a truthful filming of the plaintiff when actually engaged
in a part of her work on the case. It will be remembered that New
York, immediately after the Court of Appeals had decided that there
was no right of privacy,' passed a statute prohibiting the use of a
person's name or picture, without his written consent "for advertising
purposes or for purposes of trade"; making such use a misdemeanor,
and granting the party injured remedy by injunction and by action for
damages, in certain cases even exemplary.2  Under this statute the
plaintiff now sued, for an injunction and for damages, complaining of
the use of her picture and name among the news items of the defend-
ant's film weekly, as well as on the billboards in front of the theatre at
which the weekly was shown. The complaint was dismissed. The
court's discussion comes down, at bottom, to a paradox: the statute
went so far that it simply could not be held to go so far. If the statute
had provided simply for civil rights in aggrieved parties, it might bear
the construction the plaintiff put on it; but the misdemeanor provision,
under such a construction, would make a crime of exhibition of the
picture of any public gathering unless written consent were secured
from every identifiable person in the picture. The court did not feel
it proper to make the language of the statute produce such a result.
The opinion drew a sound distinction between movies purveying
fiction and those purveying news,3 reaching the conclusion that the use
of accurate names and pictures in current issues of a news film did not
fall under "purposes of trade" within the meaning of the statute, any
more than would such use in the current daily papers.
On the question whether the use of the name and picture of the
plaintiff in exhibits before the theatre was not a use "for advertising
purposes" there is more room for difference of opinion. It would
seem, indeed, that an advertisement may.be so incorporated into the
news organ itself, as to become a permissible part of it; if, for
instance, the name and picture of the plaintiff were used as the leading
feature of a table of contents on the cover of a weekly, the obvious
1Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (2902) 7I N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442,
59 L. R. A. 478.
2 Civil Rights Law, secs. 50, 51.
'Thus distinguishing Binns v. Vitagraph Co. (1913) 2IO N. Y. 51, 103 N. E.
iIO8, L. R. A. 1915 C 839, Ann. Cas. I9i5B lO24.
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object of the get-up being to induce people passing news-stands to buy
and read the paper. Exhibits in the lobby of a motion-picture theatre
may fairly be likened to such a cover, so far as they present the films
actually running at the time, as apparently in the instant case. But
suppose their purpose is to announce the program of the coming week;
or that the posters are put on billboards not fairly within the theatre-
entrance. Suppose a newspaper on Thursday runs a display of the
picture and name of a plaintiff, with the announcement that his whole
story, illustrated, will appear in the Sunday issue. There would seem
to be much to be said in favor of the view of the two dissenting judges
who would have made the statute applicable so far as regarded the
poster advertisements.
Poole v. Perkins (i919, Va.) ioi S. E. 24o, is a case full of interest
for the theory and practice of the conflict of laws. A man and his
wife, resident and domiciled in Bristol, Tenn., executed and delivered
there a joint promissory note; but the note was payable at a bank
across the line in Bristol, Va. By the then law of Tennessee-since
changed-the note of a married woman could not be enforced over
her plea of coverture. Suit was brought in Virginia, after the makers
had become resident and domiciled in Bristol in that state; under Vir-
ginia local law there was no incapacity. Recovery was allowed. The
reasoning of the court was notably full and able.
It is established by the cases that incapacity for coverture imposed
by the lex domicilii is a purely local protection covering only locally
made contracts and suits in local courts; that a contract otherwise
valid, if "made" in a state where women have capacity, is valid every-
where, save where the policy of the forum forbids its enforcing such
contracts; and that this holds true even where the contracting married
woman remained physically in the state of her domicile, and only
"made" the contract in another state by agent or by letter.4 The con-
clusion generally drawn is that the place of entering into the contract
governs capacity to make commercial contracts, as it does in this
country capacity to contract marriage. The principal case, dealing
with a contract made in the state of domicile, now aligns itself with
those minority decisions5 and dicta which treat the law of the place of
performance as, in the absence of other indication, the law intended by
the parties to govern the contract; which give legal effect to that
intention; and which subject to that law not merely questions of valid-
ity and interpretation, but the determination of capacity to contract as
well.' This illustrates anew the marked- tendency of our courts to
' (r9x8) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 816.
'Ibid., 8M8, notes 7, 8; most of them are cited in the opinion.
'There remains the possibility that form may be governed by the law of the
place of making. The court in the instant case expressly avoids passing on that.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
find a single law to govern all aspects of any one transaction; from
that angle alone the decision is worth note. But its striking feature
is found in the direct challenge of its reasoning to the territorial theory
on which most of our discussion of conflict of laws has been based.
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that to subject the question of
capacity to the intention of the parties is incompatible with any theory
of territorial validity of law.' Capacity involves a person's legal
power to have an intention which is legally effective. Capacity must
therefore be conferred by some system of law, before the intention to
subject the contract to the law of the place of performance can become
legally operative. But if a married woman domiciled in Tennessee,
and concluding her contract within Tennessee's borders, can project
herself by mere intention into capacity in Virginia; and if, as we may
fairly assume, the courts of Tennessee would not recognize such
capacity in a suit on the contract brought against her in Tennessee-
then she is deriving her capacity from a law with which she has no
personal or territorial connection. If the law of Virginia is operating
to give her that capacity, it is operating outside Virginia's borders, on
a person not shown ever to have been in Virginia or "subject to
Virginia law" up to the time of contracting. And when the courts of
Virginia enforce the contract against her, as they have, it must be
because they accord her the capacity, even while she is in Tennessee,
to bind herself contractually by acts done in Tennessee.
8
The JOURNAL has taken the position, and sees little reason to depart
therefrom, that there are good reasons in policy for choosing the place
of making to govern capacity to make a commercial contractY Those
' (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 818; Parmelee in 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 764
and L. R. A. 1916 A 1058; Lorenzen, Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills and
Notes (1919) 72. Cf. the admirable statement of territorial theory quoted in
the opinion from Minor, Conflict of Laws (9Ol) 410:
"The only law that can operate to create a contract is the law of the place
where the contract is entered into (lex celebrationis). If the parties enter into
an agreement in a particular state, the law of that state alone can determine
whether a contract has been made. If by the law of that state no contract has
been made there is no contract. Hence, if by the lex celebrationis the parties
are incapable of making a binding contract, there is no contract upon which the
law of any other state can operate. It is void ab initio."
' The careful reasoning of the Virginia court would lead to the same result,
if the place of performance selected by the defendant had been New York; and
it is believed that the same result would have been reached in such a case. To
be sure, the general principles laid down are sharply weakened, as in so many
conflict cases, by the fact that they lead squarely-as so often in the "intention"
cases-to the application of the forum's local law. Only a decision in which the
forum rejects its own local law has full value as a precedent. But while this
may weaken the case as an authority for the contract doctrine involved, it does
not impair its cogency as an illustration of the inadequacy of the territorial
theory to explain the facts.
'Loc. cit., 817.
COMMENTS
reasons apply, indeed, much less forcibly, if at all, to contracts made
by correspondence, where the place of "making" is largely dependent
on chance. And if a woman can secure herself contractual capacity
by merely posting a letter or sending an agent into another jurisdic-
tion, there is little cause to refuse her power to accomplish the same
result by writing into the contract a properly chosen place of perform-
ance. This the principal case well brings out. Perhaps the most com-
mercially advantageous solution would be an alternative rule: if one
has capacity either by the law of the making or by the law of the per-
formance, the contract is good in that particular.10 But whichever
of these rules be favored, the instant case retains its vital significance.
It can be explained in one way only: by recognition that it is the
forum which picks the system of law which is to govern a given inci-
dent of a transaction, and which thereby incorporates the local rule
of that system into itself, as its own rule for the transaction at bar,
thus at bottom applying in every case its own law to rights of its own
creation.
But one does not have to resort to the conflict of laws to find that
married women are a source of trouble-at least to lawyers. The
process of freeing them from the disabilities of coverture is still
slowed down by an occasional monkey-wrench in the machinery. In
Ohio, for instance, the legislature passed an act in 1887. It provided
(General Code, Iection 7999) that "a husband and wife may enter into
any engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other per-
son, which either might if unmarried . . ." and further, (section
8000) that "a husband and wife cannot by any contract with each
other alter their legal relations, except that they may agree to an imme-
diate separation." Some twenty years later an agreement was exe-
cuted in due form, in which a certain wife in consideration of five
promissory notes given her by her husband released all dower rights
in his estate. On her predeceasing him, her administrator brought
suit on the notes-and failed to recover. Dit Bois v. Coen (1919,
Oh.) 125 N. E. 121. A divided court found that the use of the word
legal, rather than marital relations in the provision above quoted,
showed that the legislature intended "that there should be no altera-
tion either of marital or of property relations in the nature of expect-
ancies, except in the case of immediate separation." It is difficult to
understand this niggardly restriction of "legal relations" to expect-
ancies; if no judicial notice is to be taken of common sense, why not
give "legal" its full meaning, let section 8ooo wholly nullify section
7999, and be done with it? The present interpretation is an invitation
"Cf. Lorenzen, op. cit., 8o; Dulin v. McCaw (894) W. Va. 72i, 20 S. E.
68r; Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. i9o5) secs. io2, 1O4.
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to further litigation. On the other hand, the court overlooks an argu-
ment of ponderous import: section 7999 in itself never did give power
to husband and wife to contract for release of either's dower interest:
is a release of dower interest a transaction "which either might enter
into if unmarried"?
Nonetheless, Married Woman's Property Acts do have their effect.
A plaintiff was being driven by her husband in his car; his negligence
and that of the defendant street-car company combined to bring about
a collision in which the plaintiff was injured. When she sued, the
company sought to identify her with her husband's contributory negli-
gence. It was very properly held that since the Act he no longer had
any interest in her cause of action, and that she might recover although
his negligence was one contributing cause. Brooks v. British Colunt-
bia Electric Ry. (i919, B. C.) 3 West. Weekly Rep. io9. Which
raises the question: how if she had elected to sue him as one of the
joint tort-feasors? On this the courts are, as is known, by no means
agreed." But some have taken the sane position vigorously: "If she
may sue him for a broken promise, why may she not sue him for a
broken arm ?12
Another reminder that the law of contributory negligence is being
radically rewritten comes from the Supreme Court in Chicago, Rock
Island and Pacific Ry. v. Cole (December 8, i919) October Term,
i919, No. 29o. The plaintiff sued for the death of her intestate, who
had been killed by a train approaching in full view. "If the question
were open for a ruling of law, it would be ruled that the plaintiff could
not recover. But the Oklahoma Constitution provides that 'the
defence of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in
all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be
left to the jury.' "3 The jury had found for the plaintiff. The argu-
ment that the company had a vested right to the defence was "dis-
posed of by the decisions that it may be taken away altogether.
It is said that legislation cannot change the standard of conduct, which
is matter of law in its nature into matter of fact, and this may be con-
ceded; but the material element in the constitutional enactment is not
that it called the contributory negligence fact, but that it left it wholly
to the jury. There is nothing, however, in the Constitution of the
United States or its Amendments that requires a State to maintain the
line with which we are familiar between the functions of the jury and
those of the court."
' (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, Io8I. Cf. also Coffinbarger v. Coflinbarger
(1918, Ky.) 203 S. W. 533.
"Brown v. Brown (1914) 88 Conn. 42, 46, 89 AtI. 889, 891.
i Cf. the Arizona statute described in ArL-ona Copper Co. v. Hammer (igig)
30 Sup. Ct. 553, (I919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 25.
